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I. Introduction 
In 1989, the tearing down of the Berlin Wall marked the beginning of the 
end of the Cold War. Once again, some forty years after Hitler had set the 
world on fire in his search for a "new world order", the world set about 
searching for this seemingly elusive concept. Nearly a year later, in a 
speech to Congress, President Bush spoke of "a new world ... stroggling to 
be born, a world quite different from the one we have koown, a world where 
the rule of law supplants the rule of the jungle, a world in which nations 
recognise the shared responsibility for freedom and justice, a world where 
the strong respect the rights of the weak". While America spoke of a New 
World Order and the world speculated about the move from bi-polarity to 
uni-polarity or a return to a concert of powers, some remembered that the 
Second World War had begun with Hitler proposing 'a new world order'. 
Then when his quest w~s finally put to rest, the end of the Second World 
War saw the birth of the United Nations and another New World Order was 
born (Suter, 1992, p l I). 
Mter the failure of the League of Nations and the devastation of the war 
years, the establishment of the United Nations was welcomed as the 
beginning of a new international order. This was to include all of the nations 
of the world. Two world wars in fairly quick succession had finally put to 
rest any isolationist ideas and Kant's prophetic insight of the eighteenth 
century that "The intercourse ... which has been everywhere steadily 
increasing between the nations of the earth, has now extended so 
enormously that a violation of right in one part of the world is felt all over 
it," was ackoowledged (lnis, 1964, p 251). The founders of the United 
Nations spoke of cooperation, of a joining of all states, large and small, for 
the common good. Even Stalin proclaimed, "It will be a new, special, fully 
authorized international organization having at its command everything 
necessary to defend peace and avert new aggression". The idea of a world 
state or government was not unique to this period. Grand plans for world 
organization had appeared from as early as the fourteenth century, but it is 
generally agreed that it is Kant's work Perpetual Peuce published in 1795 
which did seem to have some influence on the setting up of the United 
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Nations (see Inis, 1964, p 51 and Brown, 1992, p 46). Kant had expressed 
the ideas of a world confederation and it is this which many see reflected in 
the Charter of the UN. 
In a confederation, as opposed to a federation, each nation retains full 
sovereignty and relinquishes only specified powers to the central unit. This 
unit cannot compel its members to observe its decisions and act in 
accordance. In a federation, however, the central authority is capable of 
expanding its powers, usually through up to date interpretations of its 
constitution, and the members are legally bound to decisions of the central 
unit. 
The institution of this new world order was to have au assembly of all 
member states and any newly formed states were to be allowed membership. 
This assembly could not be likened to a parliament as it had no power. It 
was more of a parlement (using the literal French translation 'to speak'), as it 
was empowered under Article I 0 to discuss any matters within the scope of 
the Charter. Power was to be in the hands of the executive or the victorious 
allies, collectively known as the Security Council. 
The Charter of the United Nations came into effect on 24th October, 1945. 
Article I states that the primary purpose of the UN is to maintain peace and 
security. It is Article 2 that reaffmns the principle of the sovereign equality 
of all members. However following on from this, it is stated that collective 
action will be used to prevent threats to the peace or other aggressive action 
aud for the purpos~s of adjustment or settlement of international disputes. It 
is Chapter VII of the Charter that sets out the procedures to be followed for 
collective measures against uncooperative or aggressive states. This was 
seen by many as the 'teeth' that the League of Nations had lacked. It was 
this ability for collective action that was expected to make the United 
Nations a successful and truly international institution. The steps set out in 
chapter seven were the best way to deter and punish any state that broke 
away from the norms of the international society. However, as we have 
seen in the decades following its inception, this has not been carried out as 
intended. As Seyom Brown (1992, p 47) tells us it is this ability to 
coexcively enforce its decisions, despite the deference to national 
3 
sovereignty in the Charter, that has embodied a potentially fatal 
contradiction of assigning a characteristically federal mission to an 
organization built on confederal foundations. 
---·~--·~··""-'-· 
However it was as if the great powers, once having joined to give birth to 
this organization, immediately set about divorcing each other. The division 
of ideological interests among the world powers overtook the original 
theoretical bases for the United Nations. As Brian Urquhart (1986, p 389) 
tells us "Under the pressure of events, the great powers, soon followed by 
the other states, gradually abandoned the assumptions and principles of the 
Charter by failing to co-operate in implementing them". The world, in an 
ideological contest, divided into two hostile camps and world politics 
became a balance of power between the two blocs. The organization of the 
United Nations with its system of collective security and its methods to 
settle disputes in place, sat on the side lines while the nations of the world 
continued with their efforts to solve their own problems. All the major 
decisions affecting the international society during the next forty three years 
of the Cold War were made in Washington and Moscow and since the 
seventies, also in Beijing, not at the United Nations (Bell, 1993, p 50). 
Today, as the world approaches the twenty first century, it is acknowledged 
that the cold war has now ended, and as Coral Bell noted in her article The 
Fall and Rise of the UN (1993, p 50), "even in its earliest days just after the 
Second World War, the United Nations was far less relevant to the well-
being of the society of states than it is at the moment". As the smaller states 
of the international system recognise that they no longer can rely on the 
larger powers to protect and look after them, it is to the security services of 
the United Nations that they are turning. Also the leaders of the major 
powers are looking to the UN to provide the unity that the international 
society has been lacking since the end of the second world war. For many, 
the writer included, it is important that the end of the Cold War does not 
become an isolated moment in history and the international processes now 
begun be allowed to retreat and the states granted a free hand to re-
monopolize international relations (Banks and Shaw, 1991 p 15). However 
the UN can only lead the new world order to the extent that the nations of 
the world allow it, as it was the nations themselves that relegated it to the 
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sidelines at its creation. It remains to be seen if their actions actually 
accomplish the desires expressed in their rhetoric. 
The leaders of the world's seven major industrialised countries during their 
London Summit Meeting in July 1991 expressed the idea that the UN should 
lead this New World Order when they declared that 
the conditions now exist for the United Nations to fulfil 
completely the promise and the vision of its founders. A 
revitalised United Nations will have a central role in 
strengthening the international order. We commit ourselves to 
making the U.N. stronger, more efficient and more effective in 
order to protect human rights, to maintain peace and security 
for all and to deter aggression 
Following on from this, June 1992 saw the United Nations Secretary 
General Boutros Boutros-Ghali publish a report titled An Agenda for Peace. 
The reading of this report incited much debate in academic and political 
circles as to the role the United Nations was to play in the world community 
as it approached the twenty first century. 
While the end of the Cold War opened up the way for the UN to take its 
rightful place in international relations, the Gulf War provided the 
opportunity for it to demonstrate the effectiveness of co-operation and the 
principles of collective security envisaged by its founders. The most 
important way in which we are beginning to see the UN work as first 
envisaged is in the area as designated in chapter seven of the Charter. It is 
in this chapter that a series of graduated steps is set out in order to enforce a 
recalcitrant state to comply with the norms of the international society 
(Evans, 1993, p 133). 
While the words used in the articles of the Charter are "measures ... to 
maintain or restore international peace and security" it is generally 
understood that these measures are now referred to as sanctions. While the 
term sanction is not used in official documents, the journalists reporting on 
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international events, and the leaders of states involved, refer to any 
'measures' undertaken as the imposition of sanctions. 
Since the end of the Cold War, or since 1990, the UN has imposed five 
instances of sanctions. They were against Iraq, former Yugoslavia, Somalia, 
Libya and Haiti. Previous to 1990, in its forty five year history the UN hal! 
only imposed sanctions on two occasions, against Rhodesia and against 
South Africa. It is interesting that during this period the use of sanctions 
was steadily on the increase. In 1983 Hofbauer and Schott presented a 
comprehensive and systematic analysis of ninety nine cases of sanctions 
being imposed against states. 
Prior to World War II economic sanctions were seldom used. In the twenty 
five years between 1914 and 1939, which includes the first World War 
period, only thirteen instances of the use of economic sanctions occurred. 
This total is lower than for any decade since 1940 (Rothgeb, 1993, p 77). 
During this period the League of Nations possessed the power to impose 
sanctions on recalcitrant states and this was seen as being the great deterrent 
against any state breaking the norms of the international society. However, 
in 1935 the threat of sanctions and later the implementing of them did not 
deter Mussolini in his military invasion of Abyssinia. 
The West does not shrink from imposing economic sanctions against those 
countries that are not part of its exclusive domain. Since 1950 the western 
world has imposed a total of eighty economic sanctions around the world. 
Four (5%) have been aimed at other western states, eleven (14%) have been 
against the communist bloc and sixty five (81 %) have been directed at 
underdeveloped countries. Those countries that are poor and thus unable to 
offer any meaningful retaliation have faced the brunt of these sanctions 
(Rothgeb, 1993, p 79). 
So it seems obvious that this widespread use of sanctions is not about to 
diminish. This has led to an increase in the written matter on the subject in 
the media and also in academic manuscripts. The majority of the literature 
has been concerned with the effectiveness of the sanctions, and while the 
greater part of the evidence contained within this literatnre points towards 
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the inability of international sanctions to achieve the goals required of them, 
the practice of countries sanctioning other countries continues. Analysts of 
international sanctions have often proclaimed the importance of the sender 
nation gaining co-operation from others if sanctions are to be successful. In 
many cases reported as unsuccessful, such as the US sanctions against Cuba 
and the attempts to impose a grain embargo against the Soviet Union in 
1980, the problem has been exposed as the failure to gain international 
support (Martin, 1993, p 408). The receiver nations are often successful in 
countering the sanctions by increasing internal solidarity and negotiating 
with other nations. 
These contrast with the level of international co-operation mounted against 
Iraq when it invaded Kuwait in 1990/91. As Rothgeb (1993, p 104) informs 
us, the UN sanctions applied against Iraq before, during and after the Gulf 
war in 1991 covered virtually all goods entering and leaving Iraq and were 
vigorously enforced by an impressive international coalition. From all 
reports, the UN efforts greatly disrupted the Iraq economy and caused 
severe problems. Yet the Iraq government never gave in to the UN demands 
regarding Kuwait. As Lisa Martin (1993, p 407) argues, "international 
acquiescence in the boycott was so extensive that Saddam Hussein's sales of 
oil began to suffer immediately, and sanctions continued even after Iraq's 
military defeat". 
While this shows the international community being led by the United 
Nations the practice of imposing penalties outside the United Nations has 
increased the function and meaning of sanctioning. Britain alone imposed 
sanctions on Argentina in 1982 and United States Presidents since Carter 
have repeatedly used the process of sanctioning other nations. As Judith 
Miller wrote in 1980 (p 118), "economic sanctions, once shunned by 
American foreign policy makers in all but the most serious of international 
confrontations, are suddenly in vogue". Today, when speaking of 
international sanctions, it would be unrealistic to limit the discourse to those 
imposed by the UN. When looking at the number of sanctions that have 
been imposed since the end of the Second World War it becomes obvious 
that the process of sanctioning or penalising a nation as a consequence of a 
wrongdoing has moved outside the realm of international institutions to be 
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used by countries in an attempt to achieve foreign policy goals. This is not 
the United Nations acting out its designated role but single nations or small 
groups of nations acting together to impose hardships against another 
member of the international community. So the question must be asked, in 
this post Cold War world will the major powers allow the UN, their own 
international organization, to take the lead in handing out sanction~ against 
deserving states or will they insist on their sovereign right to coerce and 
punish other states? 
With the closing of the Cold War and a New World Order being established, 
the relevance of each separate nation in the international society using, as 
part of its own statecraft, the right to impose measures or sanctions against 
another needs to be questioned. It is my intention to establish that a 
sanction is punitive in intent and that this punitive intent is being ignored in 
the case of international sanctions. When sanctions are recognised as 
punishments it becomes obvious that they must only be imposed as a result 
of a state moving away from the norms of the international society, and the 
punishment for such must only be handed out with the legitimate authority of 
the international society. In order for this to be achieved, I will argue, it is 
the theory of each nations' sovereign right to impose penalties against each 
other that has outgrown its usefulness and is no longer applicable in the post 
cold war, or post-modern world. Finally, I will look at the theories of 
cooperation that must now be put into practice for the global village of the 
twenty first century to survive. It will be shown that the only acceptable 
way for the sanctioning process within world politics is to be workable is if 
the institution of the United Nations can now insist that the nations of the 
world cooperate to recognise the need for, and to hand out punishments to 
states or international groups that stray from the accepted norms. 
8 
2. International Sanctions. 
In order for us to understand that the policy of sanctioning is not a new 
phenomenon two of the most influential works on sanctions during the last 
decade (Baldwin, 1985 and Hulbauer & Schott, 1985) have begun their 
works with the story of Athens punishing Megara for its support of Corinth 
during the battle of Sybota in 432 B.C. by forbidding any trade between 
Megara and the Atheni.an Empire. Others mention that "collective sanctions 
were to be part of Sully's Grand Design in the sixteenth century for keeping 
order jF the world" (Strategic Survey, 1993, p 39) and it is well known how 
Irish :tenants practised a policy of exclusion or non communication against 
Captain Charles Boycott in 1880. In 1933 Charles Remer wrote his 
important book entitled A Study of Chinese Boycotts in which a simple 
statement about the Chinese boycott of Japan is abie to reveal an adequate 
definition of this action. "The Chinese said, in effect, we will not buy 
Japanese goods until the Japanese do what we want them to do, or better, 
until they stop doing certain things we do not want them to do" (pI). 
Remer was writing during the time of the League of Nations and while he 
cites several differences between the Chinese boycotts and those of the 
League, he does think that it is conceivable that the league may come to 
regard the use of boycotts as a weapon that could be used by the collection 
of nations in international relations and Remer sees the boycott used in this 
way would be a powerful weapon. 
Sanctions, as we know them today, incorporate the use of boycotts, 
embargos and other forms of economic and diplomatic actions. Prior to the 
Second World War sanctions tended to foreshadow or accompany warfare. 
However, today, most who use economic sanctions envision them as a 
substitute for ntilitary resources. It will be noted that in the later decades of 
the twentieth century all international sanctions have tended to become 
econontic sanctions, attacking trade and the monetary housekeeping of the 
target state. 
While in 1933 Remer saw the result of the Chinese boycott as a success, 
today the literature regarding sanctions views them as generally 
I [c 
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unsuccessful. Wallensteen, writing in 1968, examines economic sanctions 
that were imposed between the years 1932 to 1967 and concludes that 
generally economic sanctions have been unsuccessful as a means of 
influence in the international system. Ten years later Losman (1979) 
concludes that while sanctions do bring about economic hardship on the 
target country they are unsuccessful in producing their political goals. When 
Hufbauer and Schott in 1983 presented their comprehensive and systematic 
analysis of 99 cases of sanctions, they concluded that sanctions have a 40 
percent success rate, however when we look at the cost involved to the 
sender nation these odds do not seem that good at all. 
While most observers write of the ineffectiveness of sanctions, governments 
continue to impose them and scholars debate over what goals they were 
intended to achieve and if there was any degree of success in the application 
of the sanctions. It appears to be their effectiveness as instruments of 
foreign policy that the major part of the literature on international sanctions 
is concerned with. Exactly how this effectiveness is to be assessed, as well 
as the original objectives for the sanctions being implemented, appear to be 
contentious issues. Even agreement on a definition of what an 'international 
sanction' is little lone what it does or how well it does it seems to be 
unattainable. 
Robin Renwick in Economic Sanctions (1981, p 2) said that "sanctions may 
be defined in legal terms as the penalty imposed to ensure compliance with 
a law" but then goes on to say that "in current international usage sanctions 
are conceived essentially as the imposition of economic penalties to bring 
about a change in the political behaviour of the country against which they 
are directed". It appears that Renwick is inferring that a penalty is a hurtful 
measure imposed to achieve other purposes not a punishment imposed 
because of an act of wrong doing (Nos sal, 1989, p 309). 
Baldwin, in Economic Statecraft (1985, p 36), notes in exasperation that the 
term 'sanctions' is used in so many different ways that there is much to be 
said for avoiding it altogether. The one place where it is omitted is within 
the Charter of the United Nations and the word itself appears not to be seen 
- -~-- .. --"-.·---- -·-----
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in UN documents. Ruth Lapidoth (1992, p 114) explains that this is because 
it may imply an element of punishment 
If we look at the Latin origin of the word 'sanction' it clearly establishes the 
relationship between a wrong doing and the hurts imposed on wrongdoers. 
Sanctio was the penalty specified for a transgression of a law or decree. 
The Latin origin thus suggests that a sanction is not simply a penalty 
imposed for a violation of the rules; it is a punishment for a wrong deemed 
to be immoral, or offensive to the moral conscience and damaging to the 
interests of the community as a whole (Nossal, 1989, 306). Joel Feinberg, 
in Doing and Deserving (1970), argues that we make such distinctions in 
domestic law between 'penalties' for rule breaking such as overstaying one's 
time at a parking meter and 'ptntishments' for acts of wrongdoing that are 
morally offensive to the community and therefore involve hard treatment and 
condemnation. 
It is important to note that sanctions are only imposed in response to an act. 
It must be remembered that the primary use of sanctions is to ensure 
conforntity with the norm. A prerequisite for a sanction being imposed upon 
a State is that it has been perceived that this State has moved away from the 
norm. Unfortunately it has been the practice of using the word 'sanction' for 
a collection of instruments of a Nation's statecraft that has tended to confuse 
the issue and distort the meaning of the term itself (Nossal, 1989, p 305). 
James Lindsay (1986, p !55) suggests that when states use sanctions, they 
are seeking to achieve one or more of five broad ~ds or goals. These goals 
are compliance, subversion, deterrence, international symbolism or domestic 
symbolism If, as I have argued, sanctions are imposed following an act of 
wrongdoing, it is difficult to exclude the punitive objective - the goal of 
punishing. 
Since the late 1980's writers have been prepared to recognise an element of 
punishment in sanctions. In 1987 Margaret Doxey, in her revised second 
edition of International Sanctions in Contemporary Perspective (p 4), noted 
"it is still possible - and desirable - to preserve the sense of sanctions as 
penalties linked to real or alleged ntisconduct". Richard Nossal published 
an article in 1989 titled International Sanctions as International 
II 
Punishment and in 1993 and 94 the journal Ethics and International Affairs 
publish article~ enforcing this (Clawson, 1993 and Darnrosch, 1994). 
A punishment is not an end in itself. We do not impose punishments just for 
the sake of punishing. A punishment is handed out in order to achieve an 
end result related to the wrongdoing. In order to assess if the theory of 
punishing wrongful acre can be successfully used within the international 
system, which is perceived to have no legitimate superordinate authority, we 
must explore the various theories and purposes of punishment. 
~·-··---. .....,..,.-.---~,..-.....-·~. -~---,..,....--..,-..... -~--.-----.-------------
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3. Punishment in International Relations. 
At some time in our lives, from the moment that we begin interacting with 
people, we punish and are punished by others. Most of us find that the 
angry reaction to a wrong doing and the desire to punish is ingrained within 
us and accept it as a norm. When these situations take place there is 
generally some unpleasantness or deprivation associated with one or other 
party. As Alfred Lindesrnith in the Encyclopaedia of Social Sciences (1966, 
p 217) tells us, "the full- fledged punishment situation is thus a complex 
social relationship in which the perceptions, motives, and intentions of both 
parties are essential features". 
During this century there have been two questions that have dominated the 
literature regarding punishment. The first problem has been the ongoiq 
debate of finding a suitable definition for the word itself. Secondly the 
various theories that attempt to explain the reasons or justifications for the 
practice of punishing have filled the pages of the manuscripts about 
punishment. In order to define the word punishment we will trace the ideas 
put forth by different writers through the ages and look at how the practice 
of imposing punishments within the domestic political arena is comparable 
to world politics. 
Grotius, writing in the seventeenth century, defined punishment as "the 
infliction of an ill suffered for an ill done (cited in Bean, 1981, p I). Bean 
himself, writing in the twentieth century, seems to agree with this definition 
of long ago saying that "the essence of punishment is that it involves 
suffering" (1981, p 1). Hobbes, in chapter 28 of Leviathan, calls 
puaishment an evil but points out that it is a public authority that inflicts the 
punishment. Bosanquet (1899, p 203), tells us that Durkheim, who has 
become known as the Father of Sociology, defined punishment as having a 
negative character and saw the act of punishing "simply as a reaction of a 
strong and determinate collective sentiment against an act which offends it". 
During the later half of this century other writers have expanded the 
definition, as shown with Frinberg in 1970 adding the words that punishment 
includes "judgements of disapproval and reprobation". John Kleining in 
13 
1991 explains punishment as a deliberate imposition, and goes on to say that 
there is a stigma attached to the act of punishing as the person being 
punished is deemed to have acted in a morally discreditable manner. 
However it is a list of five elements that Flew (1954) sees as essential to 
punishment, that have become the standard definition used by many. 
Because of Benn in 1958 and Hart in 1968 using these same five criteria for 
their own definitions, it has often been referred to as the Flew, Benn, Hart 
definition and is as follows: 
1 It must involve pain or other consequences normally considered 
unpleasant. 
11 It must be for an offence against legal rules. 
iii It must be of an actual or supposed 0ffender for his offence. 
iv It must be intentionally administered by human beings other than the 
offender. 
v It must be imposed and administered by an authority constituted by a 
legal system against which the offence is committed. 
Thomas McPherson (1967, p 25) finds this definition unsatisfactory, but 
fails to reply with a totally different one, except to say that "punishment is 
the infliction of an unpleasantuess on a guilty person in the interests of the 
general happiness". He then goes on to say that the definition and the 
justificat;on of punishment are hard to keep apart. Alf Ross, writing a little 
later in 1975, also finds the Flew, Benn, Hart defmition "hardly a 
satisfactory definition" (p 36). Ross sees their work deficient because it 
does not express that there is disapproval of the violation of a rule and 
provides his own definition as follows, 
punishment is that social response which: I. occurs where there 
is violation of a legal rule; 2. is imposed and carried out by 
authorized persons on behalf of the legal order to which the 
14 
violated rule belongs; 3. involves suffering or at least other 
consequences normally considered unpleasant; and 4. 
expresses disapproval of the violator (p 39). 
It is agreed that when a punishment is applied there must first be an ill done, 
a crime committed, or when referring to punishment in a juridical or 
community sense, a law or rule broken. The immediate reaction to this is 
anger, and Aristotle, in his work Politics, has defined anger as "an impulse, 
accompanied by pain to a conspicuous revenge for a conspicuous (clearly 
visible) slight directed without justification towards what concerns oneself 
of towards what concerns one's friends". It is also, he noted, accompanied 
by a certain amount of pleasure arising from the anticipation of revenge 
(cited in Brubaker, 1988, p 823). Stanley Brubaker (1988, p 8?3) tells us 
that "the anger that underlies punishment at law is for the wrong done more 
broadly to 'what concerns oneself or one's friends' this anger displays a 
caring for persons and matters beyond ones narrow self interest and 
expresses the desire to vindicate them". Punishment expresses and satisfies 
that longing for vindication. It gives shape and fmm to the anger. 
So the search goes on for a suitable definition, apparently without finding 
one that meets with majority approval. One way of coping with this 
situation has been to gradually delete the word 'punishment' from our legal 
and written language. Christie, writing in 1974, noted that terms such as 
'sanctions' or 'treattnents' were being substituted for punishment in a subtle 
attempt to conceal the nature or harshness of the word (Bean, 1981, p I). It 
is noteworthy that in 1992 Dr. Ruth Lapidoth writes "the term 'sanctions' is 
not used in official international documents, probably because it may imply 
an element of punishment" (p 114). While the actual word, 'punishment' or 
the act of punishing, may be hidden in our reading most people use the word 
every day in their vocabulary and are able to see beyond the disguise. 
With the reading of our newspapers it is obvious that the act of punishing, 
no matter what it is called, is prevalent in our society, although it must be 
noted that the form of punishment has changed through the ages. In the 
Ancien Regime punishment was used to show the power of the sovereign 
and took the form of spectacular destruction of the offender. The age of the f 
' ! 
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Enlightenment deemed these acts to be irrational, inhumane and barbarous 
(Hart, 1968, p 147). It was shown that punishment could work better for all 
within the community if the offender was reformed and deterred from 
committing the offence. These new ideas have moved along into the modern 
age and we find that as the twentieth century draws to a close punishment, 
while having changed considerably since the Ancien Regime, is still 
necessary and the rising crime rate shows that punishment has failed in its 
quest to deter people from breaking the rules of society. Many would ask 
the question, is it not the society that demanded the existence of these rules 
that was at fault, but as Ewing (1929, p 47) tells us, "the existence of society 
depends on laws and a law that is not enforced by punishment, if necessary 
will not be regarded as a law in the present stage of moral development". It 
must be agreed that this statement still holds lrue at the end of the nineteenth 
century. 
So punishment, regardless of an agreed definition, is here to stay. It must 
also be noted that this punishment still involves pain and suffering which is 
against the theories of our liberal tradition. It is the infliction of pain and 
suffering to others that liberalism seeks to avoid (Brubaker, 1988, p 825). 
John Stuart Mill in his thesis On Liberty slre~sed that the only •,eason a man 
should have to extend power over another was to prevent harm to others. It 
stands to reason that we must find a justification for punishment, but today, 
just the same as a hundred years ago, the aims of punishing, or the theories 
of why we punish, remain in open contradiction. The major opposition is 
between those who think punishment need only be just and those who 
believe that punishment must deter and reform. 
Writers who believe in the retribution theory of punishment treat 
punishment as an end in itself. Ewing {1929, p 13) says this is the essential 
characteristic of this theory. Kant and Hegel share the idea that punishment 
has no purpose in the sense of serving some end beyond itself, or producing 
some desired consequence in the future. Kant, writing in 1790, says 
"Juridical punishment can never be administered merely as a means for 
promoting another good either with regard to the criminal himself or to the 
civil society, but must in all cases be imposed only because the individual on 
whom it is inflicted has committed a crime" (1952, p 446). 
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F. H. Bradley in his work Ethical Studies written in 1927 explains 
Punishment is punishment only where it is deserved. We pay 
the penalty because we owe it and for no other reason; and if 
punishment is inflicted for any other reason whatever than 
because it is merited by wrong, it is a gross immorality, a 
crying injustice, an abominable crime and not what it pretends 
to be (p 26 -7). 
Bean (1981, p 12) referred to Francis Bradley as the "fiercestretributionist 
of modern times". Retributionists believe that a prerequisite of punishment 
is gnilt. No person is punished unless he is guilty and so deserves the 
punishment. It is not the state or the legislators who choose to punish but 
the person who chooses to break the law and so makes the choice himself. 
As Nossal (1989, p 315) says "The useful purpose of this punishment is the 
harm that will be done to the offender, an equivalence of evil suffered for an 
evil committed - au analytical construct that is fundamentally different than 
'petulance,' 'punishment for its own sake,' or sadism." 
Examples of this are seen daily within our own country as people convicted 
of crimes are locked away in prisons and the public calls for the re-
introduction of capital punishment for certain offenders. Likewise we see 
leaden; calling for the imposition of sanctions only because the perpetrators 
of wrongdoings must be punished. The New York Times, reporting 
President Carter's response to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan on 23th 
January I 980 quoted him as saying "But verbal condemnation is not enough. 
The Soviet Union must pay a concrete price for the aggressicn. That is why 
the United States has imposed stiff economic penalties on the Soviet Union". 
Cyrus Vance, Secretary of State in Carter's administration was reported as 
saying "the Soviet Union must pay a heavy price for its invasion" (Nos sal, 
I 989, p 320). 
The primary focus of this theory of punishment is in the past, only looking at 
what has been done and why it was done. The reason for the punislunent is 
that there has been an offence and the offender must be punished. There is 
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no looking towards the future in retributive punishment. However the 
second theory regarding the aim of punishment looks towards the future with 
its deterring and refornting focus. This is known as the utilitarian theory and 
it is defended by Beccaria and Bentham. 
These writers consider that the main aim of punishment is to control action. 
Bean (1981, p 30) says "many earlier philosophers such as Grotius, 
Puffendorf and Locke had considered the deterrent argument, but Bentham 
and Beccaria give it the strength that it now commands. Bentham was its 
intellectual exponent, Beccaria its humanitarian". 
Bentham saw all punishment as evil and thought that it ought only to be 
admitted in as far as it promises to exclude some greater evil. He thought all 
punishment must be justified by the value of its consequences. Utilitarians 
argue that punishment works by threat and when a punishment is applied 
this is a failure of the system. The punishment is carried out only to retain 
effectiveness for the future (Bean, 1981, p 33). Today many would agree 
that we are deterred in our actions because of the possibility of punishment 
being imposed. States have used the threat of sanctions being imposed in 
order to deter other states from actions thought to be moving against 
international norms. President Carter noted in his memoirs that the Soviets 
had to recognize that the world was against their expansionist actions after 
their invasion of Afghanistan (Nossal, I 989, p 3 I 8). It was clear that he 
meant for the sanctions to act as a deterrent against further expansion of the 
Soviet Empire. 
The third theory of punishment is to compel the offender to cease the 
wrongful behaviour. Inside the state we see this at work when the offender 
is taken out of the normal intercourse of society and so refrains from 
continuing the offence. Sanctions imposed by t.'Je international community 
against South Africa were not only to punish for the non recognition of their 
Black peoples but to compel the White minority government to cease their 
apartheid regime. 
So it can be seen that all three theories of punishment are used against 
wrongdoers both within the domestic and international political arenas. 
! 
I 
I 
I 
1 
!8 
Today as at the beginning of the century, there is no agreement on the main 
aim of punishing, as Brubecker (1988, p 825) says "we punish not just to 
discourage future wrongs to our well being but to express our indignation 
and reprobation at the wrong that has been done". 
Most people believe that the crime rate is rising in both national and 
international arenas and there seems to be a general feeling that we are 
failing in deterring people from breaking the law. The sentences or 
punishments we see handed out to the law breakers by our judiciary 
indicates that often the severity of t.':le punishment bears little resemblance 
to the severity of the crime. What we do see is that punishment is a 
confirmation of the power of the law or in some cases a confirmation of the 
power of the powerful. 
Within the state the government holds the legitimate power but within the 
world of states it remains a contentious issue just where the legitimate 
power lies. Today no one state is all powerful against another. Only the 
combined power of all states against one that moves away from the laws of 
the community will be successful in bringing a punishment to bear. The 
question now is whether the states can cooperate to achieve this? 
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4. Cooperation. 
As we approach the twenty first century the idea that it is an acceptable 
practice for any state or small group of states to be able to continue handing 
out punishments to any other state in a self help fashion must be questioned. 
While we have seen great changes in the world systerr.. occur relatively 
peacefully and the beginnings of cooperation among the 3tates, now is surely 
the time to look for a better way to bring justice to bear on states that move 
away from the norms of international behaviour. The theories that have led 
the study of international relations lack the ability to portray realistically the 
structure of the state's system. A new theory is needed to explain the 
movement of the system from a world engaged in a Cold War to a world 
uniting to cope with problems that previously had been unforeseen. 
The state centric model of international politics, that began to dontinate 
theories of state relations in the 1930's showed the states as individual 
actors and these states, which are sovereign in their own right, are selfishly 
driven by their own interests. The relationship between these states has 
been seen as one of competition and conflict among the individual actors in 
their quest for power. The sovereign status of these actors allows them to 
act without accountability to others and without a central authority. It is 
believed that war is inescapable as the sovereign states compete for power 
and this view still dontinates thinking about international relations (Booth, 
1991' p 527). 
Realism saw power as the moving force behind relations between states and 
the power that each state pursued was of the political-ntilitary order as 
suited the time and the place. The end of a world war and the beginning of a 
Cold War that the world watched and waited to become inflamed. While a 
form of International Law had existed since the Treaty of Westphalia in 
1648 it geemed that such a concept could not be a workable reality while 
each state was a sovereign power in its own right and acted in its own 
interest. What was needed was for all the states to agree to cooperate and 
coordinate the creation of mutually accepted legal codes. The realisation of 
this was seen as a utopian dream. 
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It must be remembered that theories reflect the time and the place in which 
they are produced. The 1930's was a time of instability and fear. There was 
fear of the devastation left by the first World War along with fear of another 
war to come. It was E. H. Carr's The Twenty Years' Crisis published in 
1939 that greatly influenced this school of thought known as Realism and 
provided the rejection of the utopian ideas found in the doctrine of Idealism. 
The collapse of the world into another war gave authenticity to the realist's 
model of world politics. While Realism was in some ways an answer to the 
failure of The League of Nations it became the basic outlines of the study of 
international relations at a time when in reality the nations of the world were 
together setting up the institutional framework for unification and 
cooperation. 
This institution, known as the United Nations, was to provide a forum for 
debate and a framework to enable nations that moved away from the norms 
of international life to be punished and so allow the world to live in 
harmony. To the followers of this realist theory the idea of all or most states 
cooperating together was seen as a utopian dream. So as the institution of 
the United Nations was relegated to the sidelines of the ways of world 
politics the Cold War validated the principles and predictions of the realists 
As the years moved by without major conflict, what we saw happening in 
reality were states accepting a code of international norms as law and 
generally, as demon&trated by their behaviour, obeying it (Kegley and 
Wittkopf, 1992). During the time of the cold war we saw many incidents of 
states cooperating. While east and west remained in an ideological dispute, 
within each bloc states were obeying the rules laid down by the leader and 
cooperating with each other. 
An attempt to update the theories of Realism in the seventies resulted in a 
school of thought known as Neorealism. Kenneth Waltz's, Theory of 
International Politics, published in 1979, became the leading work in this 
area. In an effo1 • to make the theory of international relations more 
reflective of what was actually happening in the world neorealism sought to 
incorporate economic issues into the theories of Realism. Because states ~ I 
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were banding together in groups in order to organise trade and economic 
issues on a more global perspective, Regime Theory was also incorporated. 
Regimes were formed to promote economic interests of the leader known as 
the hegemon and were thought to have a stabilising effect in world politics. 
However as the process of the formation of states into regimes was widely 
recognised, comparatively little research was conducted into the influence of 
the regimes on the behaviour of states. The school of neorealist theory still 
sees sovereign states as the main actors in world politics and these states 
exist in a relentless pursuit of power in order to secure themselves against 
other like animated unites. Along with this ran the idea that world politics 
was now a system with a definite structure to it. This structure was 
composed of the single units, namely the sovereign states. The contrast was 
often drawn between their ordered political systems within their boundaries 
and the anarchical system they existed in externally. 
Because in reality states were beginning to cooperate together for reasons of 
trade and economics as well as security, game theory was incorporated into 
Neorealist theories to explain how this could be achieved in an anarchic 
world. Most studies have focused on the Prisoner'~: Dilemma (PD) game. 
While PD is essentially a game of non cooperation it can produce 
cooperative behaviour under conditions that resemble reality in the games 
played between states. However the game is played with two players, and 
within international relations many states are often involved in any 
interaction. Each has a choice, namely cooperate or deiect and the choice 
must be made without knowing what the other will do. No matter what the 
other does, defection yields a higher payoff than cooperation. The problem 
is that if both defect, both are worse off than if both had cooperated. 
However, if the game is played over and over or iterated, the payoff is better 
for cooperation. What is not taken into account is the shadow of the future 
and the possibility of reciprocity, both of which must account substantially 
in international relations. As Haggard and Simmons (1987, p505) tell us 
"the very existence of a network of regimes and transnational relations 
among the advanced industrial states facilitates communication, enhances 
the importance of reputation, and lengthens the "shad<:w of the future". 
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The shadow of the future is an essential consideration in internation. ' 
relations. Today witl1 advanced technology and communications between 
states available in seconds all players in the world scene know that they 
must remain in the game, there really is no where else for them to go to. 
Game theory sbows that when players expect to be placed in similar 
situations in the future and with similar players the incidence of cooperation 
rises substantially (Oye, 1985, p 13). 
Rousseau's Stag Hunt is a game often used to show that even though men or 
states know that they seek a common goal they may not be able to reach it. 
If the men in the hunt cooperate and trap the stag they will all eat well but if 
one defects to catch a rabbit (which he likes less than stag) all the others will 
go hungry. While the realists and neorealists interpret this to show that 
cooperation in a group is impossible because someone will always defect. 
There is, however, a preference order: 
1 All cooperate and catch the stag (all nations cooperate in placing 
sanctions on a wrongdoer in order for the punisbment to be effective 
in having him cease his wrong and in deterring others). 
11 Chase a rabbit and eat a small meal yourself while the others are left 
hungry (one or several states to defect from unification and so lessen 
the effect of the others). 
iii All chase rabbits (remain as we are today without maki11g any 
advances for a united world - the results of this preference for the 
world could be devastating). 
Maybe today as we move into the twenty first century we could have a new 
interpretation - one that says that if we do not all cooperate to catch the stag 
(or the ones that cannot stay within the confines of the norms of world 
politics) then none of us is going to have the stag and the future will not look 
bright for any member. 
While game theory has proved to be a powerful tool in explaining how 
people and nations' behaviour when rell!ting to each other, it is in many 
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ways ambiguous and leaves many unresolved questions. It assumes that the 
players are rational and understand the rules of the game. The state is still 
seen as a single unit or player in the game and this structure tends to impose 
a 'self help' logic on the players and in reality the players in world politics 
are showing that they understand this is not going to allow them to survive 
in the twenty first century. Game theory also makes the assumption that the 
state is playing a separate political game outside its boundaries to the one it 
plays inside. The problems with this concept will be discussed more fully in 
the next chapter. 
While realist theory insisted that no state would give up their quest for 
power, this is exactly what the Soviets did in I 989 in Eastern Europe and in 
1991 within its own union. 
But, even before these happenings, at least a decade before, we saw a 
steady questioning of the adequacy of the theories of Realism in explaining 
international relations which were becoming increasingly characterised by 
many forms of cooperation that transcended the territorial borders of states. 
Indicators of its demise became apparent when papers were published with 
such titles as, The Poverty of Realism (Krauthammer, 1986), The Poverty of 
Neorealism (Ashley, !984), Is Realism Finished? (Zakaria, 1992) and as 
John Lewis Gaddis (1992, p 3 I) says 
Realism has no way of accounting for the peaceful 
relinquishment, by a great state, of its own instruments of 
authority and legitimacy, and that fact has to call into question 
the predictive potential of Cold War theory for a post-Cold 
War age. 
We have seen that states are not only prepared to, but also realise that they 
must cooperate together in all interstate or world ventures. It appears that in 
the post Cold War world the nations that make up the world community are 
showing by their actions that cooperation amongst themselves for a number 
of reasons is already happening. It is being recognised by most that not only 
must they cooperate with others for defence and security purposes but that 
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they cannot exist economically, socially and politically on their own, but 
must join together for the benefit of each and every one of them. 
Cooperation for reasons of trade and economics has been successful in the 
organisations of GAIT (General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade), OECD 
(Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development), and APEC 
(Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation) along with the World Bank and the 
International Monetary Fund. Regionally states have cooperated in 
organisations such as NATO, ASEAN and the EC. While we have seen 
cooperation between the nations involved within these groups to impose 
punishments on recalcitrate nations or states it is really only when sanctions 
were set against South Africa and later imposed on Iraq that cooperation 
between a significant number of the world community cooperated together. 
It is now time to update and look beyond the notion of what the theory of 
realism is about. The states in the world can no longer be described as 
billiard balls. As Ferguson and Mansbach (1991, p 370) tell us 
This conception of the world of sovereign states presents only 
about as accurate a vision of the 'real world' as a hollywood 
western stage set does of the old American West. It is not 
entirely fiction, but it is primarily a fiction. It is no more that 
pseudorealism. 
It is now reasonable that with the end of the Cold War we can now see the 
outlines of a potentially new system of world politics and a new theory is 
needed to guide and explain its concepts. The rigidity of the theories 
incorporated within Realism need to be addressed and the real situation of 
change from the modem industrial world to the postrnodem, post indnstrial 
one accounted for. 
As Ken Booth in his inaugural lecture to students and staff at the University 
College of Wales (1991, p 523) said "But despite its insights and pre-
eminence, realism has deep problems as the lens through which students and 
practitioners look at world politics". If we go back to the second edition of 
E. H. Carr's The Twenty Years' Crisis published in 1966, Carr himself notes 
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that while utopia and reality are different planes, there could be a need for a 
combination of utopia and reality and he also saw the importance of basing 
thought on elements of both utopia and reality (Booth, 1991, p 561). 
By combining the processes of cooperation that are actually happening in 
the post Cold War world with guidelines of explanation and prediction we 
will arrive at an 'lpproach that can be called 'utopian realism' (Booth, 1991, 
p 533). If it is utopian thinking to see the players in world politics 
cooperating fully together to hand out punishments to the law breakers 
Utopian thinking can set goals and stir people into action. It can provide a 
map with a destination that seems to have been missing from the theories of 
world politics. 
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5. Sovereignty in Transition. 
Since the seventeenth century the sovereign state has been the dominant unit 
of politics and during this century of world politics in particular. This 
immediately raises suspicions about realist theories that treat the sovereign 
state as an inevitable and irreversible political institution (Walker and 
Mendlovitz, 1990, p 14). If the idea of sovereign states begun at some point 
back in time and has evolved to what we know as today's form of the 
sovereign state, does it not represent a historical logic instead of an 
absolute? Is the sovereigti. state, at the end of the twentieth century, still the 
same entity as in earlier times? 
Bodin, writing in the sixteenth century, while admitting that all were subject 
to the laws of God, saw sovereignty as meaning absolute and total power on 
earth. Hobbes a little later and Hegel in the earlier eighteen hundreds agreed 
that as there was no leviathan above the states a states' sovereignty was 
absolute and free from any limits (Lapidoth, 1992, p 326). There was no 
higher power than the state. It is this idea of the sovereign state that has 
dominated politics both in the domestic arena and in the international 
system. In 1979, when it was obvious that no state was free to act in any 
way it would like to without affecting others within the international 
community, Kenneth Waltz (1979, p 96) explained a states' sovereignty as 
"its power to decide for itself how it will cope with its internal and external 
problems, including whether or not to seek assistance from others and in 
doing so to limit its freedom by making commitments to them". However, 
some fifteen years later, it is questionable whether a state still possesses this 
right 
When searching for a definition of this concept, 'the sovereign state', it is not 
back to the middle ages we should look but to the precise nature and 
meaning of the word today, at the end of the twentieth century. As Ruth 
Lapidoth (I 992, p 326) tells us, "the meaning of a concept is related to the 
civilization prevailing at a certain period, and a drastic change in the 
political environment may entail a new meaning or nuance to an old 
concept". 
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Today, if we are to endeavour to locate just where state sovereignty lies, R. 
B. J. Walker (1993) tells us that we must look in two places, within the state 
and also outside the state. This dichotomy poses many problems in the post 
Cold War world as the units that make up the world struggle to find a place 
and a political identity in the New World Order. 
Within the tenitorial boundaries of the state, sovereignty is located as the 
center of power and authority. This is the sovereign center around which 
society, polity, culture, economy and tenitory orbit with a degree of 
harmony. This fixed point of power and authority inside fixed boundaries 
allows an ordered political community to exist and becomes the ultimate 
unit to protect those within its boundaries. Within the state this center of 
power also has the legitimate right to enforce compliance with the rules of 
the community and to punish those who do not abide by the rules. 
However outside these tenitori~l boundaries when sovereign states engage 
in international politics there appears to be no one center but many, and 
therefore no community only clashes and anarchy. Boundaries are central to 
the concept of sovereignty. Not only the physical that separate the tenitory 
of each sovereign entity but also the cultural boundaries that segregate the 
same from the other ana the conceptual boundaries that distinguish the 
domestic from the international (Camilleri and Falk, 1992, p 236). 
These ideas have been rooted in the early modern theory of the tenitorial 
state but in the 1970's when states were becoming more dependent upon 
each other with alliances and regimes being part of the reality of interstate 
life, new notions regarding interstate actions were exposed. Hedley Bull, a 
stimulating influence on the ideas of international relations, in 1977 
explained that while the world polity did consist of sovereign states with no 
higher power, there did exist among the states a sense of community and of 
order and justice. Because of the level of interstate relations and 
cooperation that he saw existing between the states he went on to describe 
the system of international relations as a society. His distinction between 
the concept of a system of states and that of an international society gave 
many a new insight into the relationship between states. 
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For others it became fashionable to assert that within the modem world the 
territorial state was becoming obsolete (Banks and Shaw, 1991, p 22). 
However, today no one doubts that the Nation State is an important integral 
part of the modem world system and that its complete demise is not obvious 
in the near future. But territorial states do change borders, as we have 
witnessed in the last few years with the former Soviet Union and the former 
Yugoslavia. New states are born while some disintegrate away. With 
modem communications and transport, the people who make up the 
population within the state territory also move easily across borders in great 
numbers and ballistic and nuclear weapons reduce the relevance of borders 
(Lapidoth, 1992, p 334). Organizations of people without specific territory 
such as the Palestine Liberation Organization (the PLO) have gained 
recognition from the United Nations and are allowed to participate, as the 
state of Palestine, with observer statns in the General Assembly. James 
Rosenau writing in I 990 (p I 32) tells us how he sees a state within the 
contemporary world system, 
limping along, buffeted by internal and external forces that 
drive the norms, habits and practices relevant to their capacities 
for cooperation to the brink of transformation, and yet 
managing to persist, sometimes resisting the tides of change 
and sometimes astride them, but with few exceptions 
retaining sufficient legitimacy to sustain their essential 
structures and undertake collective action. 
As has been shown in an earlier chapter, with continued interdependence 
and regime building in the international community of the I 990's, it is 
obvious to all that no state is self sufficient, no state can survive on its own 
and any decision or change in a state's actions will affect other states within 
the world polity. We have shown earlier that when a single state, deciding 
that another has committed a wrongdoing, exercises its sovereign right and 
imposes sanctions on the transgressor, it is doomed to have the sanctions 
shown as ineffective and worthless. The facts of modem life show the 
demise of the idea that the state has full and exclusive sovereignty within the 
international world. It is important as we approach a restructnring of the 
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world order that the effects of the changing economic and political 
conditions on the characteristics of the sovereign state be reassessed. 
Whenever states subscribe to international commitments and obligations 
they, invariably surrender some of their sovereignty. The ultimate cost of 
cooperation is loss of sovereignty. Today there is no way that any state 
outside its own boundaries can have or can exercise absolute power, not 
even the United States of America. Also inside the states the sovereign 
centers of power are now going through an internationalisation of the 
internal structures that were previously only the concern of those within the 
state. While the Charter of the United Nations acclaims each state's 
sovereign right to freely choose and develop its own political and social 
systems within its own territory, we have witnessed the UN declaring that 
the protection of human rights is an international concern. The world was 
able to insist that South Africa abandon the practice of not allowing the 
people of its black majority the right to representation. The United Nations 
has intervened in the internal politics of Haiti. A particularly interesting 
case, as here we have the United States asking the United Nations to impose 
sanctions and then to permit the use of military force in order to punish the 
overthrowers of the rightful government and to stop human abuse in that 
land. Our own country has been asked to look into our laws regarding the 
homosexual community within our own boundaries. States no longer have 
self contained economic systems as free trade agreements and common 
markets have rendered trade and therefore economics an international affair. 
Rousenau, writing in 1990, has persuasively argued that virtnally all 
governments are confronted by growing challenges to their control. These 
arise from the technological revolution and restraints imposed by stmctnral 
interdependencies. 
If, as I have shown, once outside its territorial borders the state no longer 
remains sovereign and in many instances within its borders its sovereignty is 
in question, where does the center of power and authority within the world 
polity lie? We have already established that norms not only exist within the 
community of states but that these norms or rules are now permeating eve!"; 
facet of international life and the framework is in place to impose 
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constructive and useful sanctions or punishments on those who break away 
from these rules. 
The states show by their actions that they accept and generally observe the 
rules of the international community (Kegley and Wittkopf, 1992, p 203). 
John Austin, who dominated jurisprudential thinking in Great Britain during 
the nineteenth century reasoned that for a legal system to exist three 
elements must be present. 
Firstly a law must be a statement in which a prescribed pattern of behaviour 
must be evident. These exist in international law in the form of treaties, 
customs and judicial decisions of the courts. Secondly a basis of obligation 
approved by the society must be present. Within the international 
community it is in the state's interest to be obligated to internatiomllaw 
after all the states are the law givers in this community. States, in the same 
manner as individuals, have discovered that consent to be bound by and 
obligated to certain rules can serve to facilitate, promote and enhance their 
welfare and opportunities within their society. Thirdly some process for 
punishing unlawful conduct in the society must be available. So we are able 
to see that it is indeed laws that the international community subscribes to 
and in general obeys (Kegley and Wittkopf, 1992, p 205). 
It is only in the third characteristic that there is a problem. Despite the 
development over the last seventy years of relatively sophisticated 
universalistic sanctions equipped international organisations, the League of 
Nations and the UN, the world community still relies primarily upon the 
principle of self help to enforce legal sanctions. As we have seen earlier, 
when discussing sanctions, still today states feel that they have the sovereign 
right to impose punishments themselves and it is this process that allows 
intemationallaw to fall short when being assessed against the characteristics 
of law. This self help process places severe restraints upon the legal 
systems' effectiveness and is the reason why many see international law as 
weak and decentralised. As Robert Art and Kenneth Waltz in their book 
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The Use of Force: International Politics and Foreign Policy (1971, p 4) 
say 
the web of social and political life is spun out of the 
inclinations and incentives, deterrent threats and punishments. 
Eliminate the latter two, and the ordering of international 
society will depend entirely upon the former- an anarchic ideal 
that is unworkable this side of the Garden of Eden. 
One may well ask why the techniques of self help can still exist when the 
unravelling of national sovereignty seems to be a feature of the post Cold 
War period? As Fleiner-Gerster and Meyer (1985, p 277) say, "the 
ttaditional concept of sovereignty no longer fits the necessities of modern 
international law. The idea that sovereignty can be neither limited nor 
divided is contrary to modern development~ in international society". 
Governments who insist in their outmoded ·views on sovereignty will 
steadily rule themselves out of the game of international relations and as I 
have stated before it is now impossible for any one state to remain in 
isolation as the world heads for the twenty first century. 
This surely is the time for the organization of the United Nations to begin to 
carry out the tasks originally set out for it to do? In this post Cold War 
period the boundaries between the national and the international are 
becoming more blurred than ever before. It is also impossible to make sense 
of emerging forms of world politics while continuing to be bound by 
categories, such as state sovereignty, that explicitly denies the possibility of 
a world politics (Walker, 1993, p 183). 
What we are left with, the one constant that remains, is the people who 
make up the 110rld polity. These people have shown that they can cope with 
different levels of loyalties. In their lifetime they remain loyal to families, to 
their own particular religions, to their nationality and in many cases to the 
government of the country that they reside in. These individuals now have 
rights within the international community and as such the international 
system is obligated to defend their rights. It is the individuals that are 
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becoming the units in international politics and this introduces the idea of 
world democracy (Holm and Sorensen, 1993, p 283). 
The modem theories of internationa 1 relations have been dominated by the 
idea of the system consisting of sovereign states. However it is the 
postrnodemists that open the door to reinvigorating the prescriptive, ethical 
dimension of theory and shift attention away from 'givens' like the nation 
state to the micro level-tile authentic repository of human loyalties and 
affections (Ferguson and Mansbach, 1991, p 365). Postrnodernist theory 
sees the end of "the grand narrative" that has begun in a fixed point in time 
but through time has enlarged into mythological dimensions and has been 
given such symbolic weight that it no longer resembles the original (Heller 
and Feher, 1988, p 2). In this case the grand narrative is the one regarding 
state's sovereignty. 
The trend towards individualism has already stated in the real world along 
with the prevailing forms of deconstruction of the written word and this 
points to a new foundation for the study of world politics, as Holm and 
Sorensen (1993, p 297) say "the propelling of individuals to center stage will 
require large-scale restructuring in our thinking". 
Part of the new world order, as stated in the agenda of the United Nations, is 
to make sure that human rights are given precedence over the sovereignty of 
states. Holm and Sorensen (1993, p 286) ask "will this lead to the gradual 
creation of an international civil society where individuals and the groups 
they form are recognized internationally alongside the states?" 
As we can see, the process of judgement and punishment on people, groups 
or states who move away from the norms or rules of the world polity does 
not lie within the foreign policies of nation states. 
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6. Conclusion. 
International sanctions have been part of the process of states interacting 
with each other since ancient times. In modern times we have seen the 
sanctioning process evolve from a much talked and written about, but little 
used, idea to one that has gained momentum and become a much used 
component of international relations. The foreign ministers of modern 
industrial countries, who are the main users of this practice have tended to 
exert their countries' sovereign right to impose these sanctions on any other 
state that they see as having made a move that they disagreed with. 
In assessing the effectiveness of sanctions, writers have looked at the ability 
of the receiver state to find an avenue to circumvent the sanctions, the cost 
to the sender nation and whether the receiver ceases the action that brought 
about the sanctions. In all of this there is much contention as to which 
sanctions are successful and which are not. What appears to be forgotten is 
that a sanction, being derived from the Latin word 'sanctio, to punish', is a 
punishment and as such should only be imposed when a law is broken. 
As the world polity is made up of people, states and organisations and it is 
these entities that have composed the norms and laws that the community 
should live by, is it possible that each can have the right to judge and pass 
sentence on ones that move away from the norms? This procedure, known 
as self help, became acceptable during the Cold War when the world was 
divided in blocs each with a leader who was overseer of this procedure. But 
the Cold War has ended and the world is searching for a new world order. 
This new world order is to rise from the recognition that no one state can 
proclaim itself the most powerful and so the leader of the others. Today, 
power is not defined in terms of military prowess, nor by economics, nor by 
technology but by a combination of these. Today it is unrealistic that any 
one state could be the most powerful in all of these categories and so 
become the hegamon. The only way that all the necessary fragments needed 
to lead the world into the next century can consolidate is by cooperation 
among the units that together make up the world. This cooperation between 
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the states has been shown not only to be acceptable, but to be already in 
practice. 
However the ultimate cost of cooperation is loss of sovereignty for the 
states, but when we look at what is actually happening in the world of states 
it is found that this elusive concept has been in a state of transformation for 
quite some time. So no one state has the 'sovereign' right to pass out 
punishments on another. Sanctions will only be used correctly and 
efficiently when they are imposed by the united nations of the world. We 
have seen the world moving in this direction with South Africa correcting its 
unlawful practice of apartheid following collective sanctions being imposed. 
The world has the structure, in the form of the United Nations Organization, 
already in place for the states to cooperate together to judge and to punish 
wrongdoers. 
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